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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
There is a large empirical literature that studies the impact of firm diversification 
on shareholder value. Lang and Stulz (1994), and Berger and Ofek (1995) find a 
significant diversification discount, and interpret the results as the evidences of value 
destruction by diversified firms. These findings have been challenged by a number of 
other papers. For example, Campa and Kedia (2002), and Graham, Lemmon and Wolf 
(2002) argue that the diversification discount is tainted by the endogeneity problems 
because firms with poor performance choose to diversify. A closely related literature 
studies through which channels firm diversification can exert its impact on firm value. 
The efficiency of the investments made by diversified firms has received substantial 
attentions from researchers. Shin and Stulz (1998), and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 
(2000) find that the internal capital market in diversified firms engages in the 
cross-subsidization by allocation too much (little) to the divisions with low (high) 
investment opportunities. Whited (2001), however, raises methodological critiques on 
the measurement of divisional investment opportunities. 
  We contribute to the debate in this literature by studying an under-researched 
channel through which firm diversification can affect firm value: corporate cash 
holdings. First, corporate cash holdings occupy a significant role in the balance sheet. 
Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2006) find that the average cash to asset ratio for industrial 
firms increases from 10.48% to 24.03% between 1980 and 2004. Opler, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz and Williamson (1999) show that mean of corporate cash holdings is greater 
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than the mean of capital expenditures or the mean of acquisitions in their data.1 Given 
the magnitude of corporate cash holdings, this is a potentially important channel 
through which firm diversification can affect firm value. Second, while much work 
has been devoted to compare the efficiency of investments made by diversified firms 
and single-segment firms, we believe that it is necessary to study whether 
shareholders value financing resources (e.g., corporate cash holdings) differently 
between diversified firms and single-segment firms. This can provide a more general 
picture on the impact of firm diversification. Third, we can bypass the difficulty in 
measuring divisional investment opportunities in some extent by studying how 
shareholders value financing resources in diversified firms. Suppose corporate cash 
holdings are anticipated to be spent by the managers on the cross-subsidization (or the 
efficient internal capital allocation), shareholders will place a lower (or higher) value 
to the cash in diversified firms in the first place. In this case, although we do not 
directly observe divisional investment opportunities, we can still draw some 
implications based on how cash is valued. 
We develop four hypotheses in this paper. First, firm diversification increases the 
value of cash holdings for financially constrained firms through efficient internal 
capital market, because more resources are allocated to the divisions with better 
investment opportunities (e.g., Stein, 1997). Second, firm diversification reduces the 
value of cash holdings through agency problems because firm diversification can be 
                                                        
1 See Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999), p17. They show that the mean of the ratio 
Cash/Net Assets is 0.170. The mean of the ratio Capital Expenditures/Net Assets is 0.090, while the 
mean of the ratio Acquisitions/Net Assets is 0.011. 
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associated with empire building (e.g., Jensen, 1986) and cross-subsidization (e.g., 
Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000). Third, the value of cash 
holdings for financially constrained firms is lower if the firms are diversified, because 
the coinsurance effect from the imperfectly correlated cash flows among different 
divisions increases debt capacity (e.g., Lewellen, 1971). Fourth, firm diversification 
increases the value of cash holdings from a shareholder’s perspective through the type 
of shareholder-bondholder conflicts proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). We 
empirically test these four hypotheses, and investigate which hypothesis is most 
relevant for the relation between firm diversification and the value of cash holdings. 
   We get a sample of 28563 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2005. We use the 
methodology in Faulkender and Wang (2006) to study the value of corporate cash 
holdings. We find that the marginal value of one dollar in diversified (single-segment) 
firms is $0.92 ($1.08), implying that the same dollar is valued 16 cents less in 
diversified firms than single-segment firms. This is consistent with the interpretation 
that firm diversification on average reduces the value of cash holdings. We divide the 
sample into financially unconstrained and constrained firms, and find that the value of 
cash is lower for diversified firms in both sub-samples. We include a measure of 
corporate governance, and find that the value of cash holdings is even lower for the 
diversified firms with more restrictions on shareholder rights. We get consistent 
results when we use an alternative measure for the unexpected change in cash 
holdings and three econometric methods to control for the potential endogeneity 
problem.  
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   These findings are most consistent with the predictions of the agency hypothesis. 
We conclude that firm diversification reduces the value of corporate cash holdings 
through agency problems. 
   The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops four 
hypotheses about the relation between firm diversification and the value of cash 
holdings. Section 3 discusses the data and describes the methodology. Section 4 
examines how firm diversification affects the value of cash holdings. Section 5 
concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
  We develop four hypotheses about the relation between firm diversification and the 
value of cash holdings in this section.  
2.1. Efficient internal capital market 
For a given amount of capital, the headquarters of a diversified firm have the 
control rights to allocate more resources to the divisions with better investment 
opportunities. Stein (1997) argues that this form of winner-picking increases the 
efficiency of internal capital allocation. We expect that among financially constrained 
firms, the value of corporate cash holdings is higher for diversified firms than 
single-segment firms. The winner-picking argument is relevant to financially 
constrained firms. If a firm is financially unconstrained, the firm can get the funding 
from external capital markets to finance good investment projects. We develop the 
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following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: Firm diversification increases the value of cash holdings in financially 
constrained firms through efficient internal capital market. 
2.2. Agency problems 
Firm diversification can be associated with agency problems. At the firm-level, 
empire-building preferences will cause managers to excessively spend available funds 
on unprofitable investment projects (e.g., Jensen, 1986). Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1990) find more negative market reactions when acquirors are engaging in unrelated 
diversification. At the segment-level, cross-subsidization can exist in diversified firms 
(e.g., Shin and Stulz, 1998). Cross-subsidization refers to the activities that corporate 
resources are diverted from the divisions with good investment opportunities to the 
divisions with poor investment opportunities. Agency problems reduce the value of 
cash holdings in a diversified firm because shareholders anticipate the inefficient use 
of cash. We develop the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Firm diversification reduces the value of cash holdings through agency 
problems. 
2.3. Coinsurance effect 
Cash flows generated by different divisions of a diversified firm are imperfectly 
correlated. Lewellen (1971) argues that this coinsurance effect can increase the debt 
capacity of a diversified firm. Faulkender and Wang (2006) find that the value of cash 
holdings is higher with the presence of greater financial constraints. Among 
financially constrained firms, we therefore expect that the value of corporate cash 
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holdings is lower for diversified firms because the coinsurance effect reduces the 
magnitude of financial constraints. The argument of the coinsurance effect is relevant 
to financially constrained instead of unconstrained firms. We develop the following 
hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 3: Firm diversification reduces the value of cash holdings in financially 
constrained firms through coinsurance effect. 
2.4. Shareholder-bondholder conflicts 
   We focus on the value of cash holdings from a shareholder’s perspective in this 
paper. Conflicts can arise between shareholders and bondholders when bankruptcy 
risk is present.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that shareholders can be viewed 
as holding a European call option on the value of the firm with the exercise price 
equal to the face value of the debt, exercisable at the maturity date of the debt issue. 
The value of cash holdings to shareholders is higher in the firms with lower 
bankruptcy risk, because the benefit of cash holdings will more likely accrue to 
shareholders instead of bondholders. Since firm diversification reduces the 
bankruptcy risk through imperfectly correlated cash flows generated by different 
divisions, we expect that the value of cash holdings is higher for the shareholders in 
diversified firms.  
Hypothesis 4: Firm diversification increases the value of cash holdings from a 
shareholder’s perspective through shareholder-bondholder conflicts in leveraged 
firms. 
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2.5. Combining the hypotheses 
  We combine the above four hypotheses into the following table. 
 
 The impact of firm diversification on the value of cash holdings 
 Efficient internal  
capital market 
Agency problems Coinsurance 
effect 
Shareholder- 
bondholder conflicts 
Financially 
unconstrained firms 
0 – 0 + 
Financially 
constrained firms 
+ – – + 
 
   This table summarizes the predictions from the four hypotheses. A plus (minus) 
sign indicates a positive (negative) impact of firm diversification on the value of cash 
holdings. A zero sign indicates no relation between these two. The predictions are 
different for financially unconstrained firms and constrained firms in some hypotheses. 
We can find that these four hypotheses are empirically testable, because the 
predictions of the four hypotheses are different from each other.  
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
We describe the data and the methodology in this section. 
3.1. Data 
   We obtain segment-level data from Compustat/Segment database. We use 
Compustat/Industrial Annual database as the source for firm-level data. We obtain 
stock return data from CRSP. The sample period is from 1998 to 2005. The Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 131 was issued as a new standard for 
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the reporting of segment information in 1997. Villalonga (2004a, 2004b), and Berger 
and Hann (2003) show that segment data before and after 1997 are not directly 
comparable to each other. Since we use the 2006 version of Compustat, we set the 
sample period from 1998 to 2005, using the data in the period after the 
implementation of SFAS 131 to ensure the comparability of data.  
   We match Compustat/Segment with Compustat/Industrial Annual and CRSP 
databases, and exclude the firms with incomplete data. Following the literature on 
firm diversification (e.g, Berger and Ofek, 1995), we exclude financial service firms 
and the firms with financial service segments (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999). 
We also require that the sum of segment sales is within 1% of the total sales of the 
firm. We define diversified firms as the firms that have at least two segments with 
different SIC codes.2 After these screening procedures, we obtain a final sample of 
6867 firms with 28563 firm-year observations. The sample contains 10828 (17735) 
firm-year observations for diversified (single-segment) firms.    
3.2. Methodology 
   Faulkender and Wang (2006) develop a methodology to measure the marginal 
value of cash holdings. We follow their method and develop the primary specification 
as follows. 
 
 
                                                        
2 We obtain similar results by defining diversified firms as the firms that have at least two segments 
with different two-digit SIC codes. 
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     where ∆Xi,t indicates a change in the variable X of firm i from year t – 1 to t.  
               (e.g., ∆Cash Holdingsi,t = Cash Holdingsi,t – Cash Holdingsi, t-1) 
           Ri,t
 
= Stock return over fiscal year t – 1 to t. 
  RBi,t = Stock i’s benchmark return over fiscal year t-1 to t. The benchmark portfolio is one of 
the 25 Fama and French portfolios formed on size and book-to-market.  
  MVi,t-1
 
= Market value of equity at year t – 1 computed as price times shares outstanding 
         Firm Diversificationi,t = A dummy variable that equals 1 for diversified firms and 0 for 
single-segment firms. 
  Cash Holdingsi,t
 
= Cash and marketable securities at year t. 
  Earningsi,t
 
= Earnings before extraordinary items over fiscal year t – 1 to t.  
  Net Assetsi,t
 
= Net assets (Total Assets – Cash Holdings) at year t.  
  R&Di,t
 
= R&D expenses over fiscal year t – 1 to t.  
  Interest Expensesi,t
 
= Interest expenses over fiscal year t – 1 to t.  
  Dividendsi,t
 
= Common dividends over fiscal year t – 1 to t.  
  Leveragei,t
 
= Leverage (Debt / Total Assets) at year t.  
  New Financingi,t
 
= Net new equity issues (equity issued minus repurchases) + Net new debt 
issues (debt issued minus debt retired) over fiscal year t – 1 to t. 
 
This methodology essentially represents a long-run event study. The event is the 
unexpected change in cash holdings, while the event window is defined as the whole 
fiscal year. In the above equation, the dependent variable is excess stock return. It is 
calculated as the stock return of firm i during a fiscal year t (Ri,t) minus its benchmark 
return over the same period (RBi,t).  This left-hand-side variable is interpreted as the 
cumulative abnormal return during a fiscal year, which incorporates the market 
reaction to the unexpected change in corporate cash holdings. We use the 25 Fama 
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and French portfolios formed on size and book-to-market as benchmark portfolios. 
For each firm-year observation, a firm is grouped into one of the 25 Fama and French 
portfolios based on the intersection between size and book-to-market. The return of 
the corresponding Fama and French portfolio is regarded as the benchmark return for 
the firm during that year.  
We first define the unexpected change in cash holdings as the realized change in 
cash holdings. Then we use an alternative measure based on the net change in cash 
holdings. In the primary specification, we measure the change in cash holdings as the 
ratio of the change in cash and marketable securities (Compustat item #1) over a fiscal 
year to the 1-year lagged market value of equity. Since both the dependent variable 
and the independent variable are scaled by the 1-year lagged market value of equity, 
the coefficient represents the dollar change in shareholder value resulting from 
one-dollar change in the amount of cash held by the firm. We can interpret this as the 
marginal value of one dollar to the shareholders of the firm.  
   We construct an interaction term, Firm Diversification * ∆Cash Holdings. Firm 
Diversification is a dummy variable that equals 1 for diversified firms and 0 for 
single-segment firms. The coefficient of this interaction term represents the difference 
in the marginal value of one dollar between diversified firms and single-segment 
firms, thus indicating the impact of firm diversification on the value of cash holdings. 
We also include the Firm Diversification dummy in the regression to ensure that the 
estimated coefficient of the interaction term is due to the interaction, and not due to firm 
diversification itself. 
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   We include other control variables in the regression as suggested by Faulkender 
and Wang (2006). They argue that the value of cash holdings depends on both 
leverage and the lag of cash holdings, and include the interaction terms between these 
two variables and the change in cash holdings in the regression. We control for 
sources of value other than cash (earnings, net assets, R&D, interest expenses, 
dividends, and new financing). We provide more details on the definition of the 
variables in the Appendix.  Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample. We 
winsorize the data to reduce the impact of outliers. 
 
 
4. Results 
We report the results in this section. We first present the relation between firm 
diversification and the value of cash holdings in the entire sample. Then we 
demonstrate the results by dividing the sample into financially unconstrained firms 
and constrained firms. Next, we add a measure of corporate governance and 
investigate its impact. Finally, we report the results using an alternative measure for 
unexpected changes in cash holding as well as three econometric methods to control 
for the potential endogeneity problem.  
4.1. The value of cash holdings 
Our primary objective is to measure the average impact of firm diversification on 
the value of cash holdings. The results are presented in Table 2. We first examine the 
marginal value of cash holdings in the entire sample, and report the results in the first 
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and the second column. In this regression, an extra dollar in cash will affect a firm’s 
excess return through the item ∆Cash Holdings and the interaction terms (Cash 
Holdingt-1 * ∆Cash Holdings and Leverage * ∆Cash Holdings). We need to use the 
coefficients of these items to obtain the marginal value. The calculation is as follows: 
The mean firm has the lag of cash holdings equivalent to 16.56% of the market 
capitalization of equity, and the mean leverage ratio is 20.14%. Therefore, the 
marginal value of one dollar to shareholders in the mean firm is $1.02 (= 1.245 + 
(−0.726 ∗ 16.56%) + (−0.509 ∗ 20.14%)).  
   In the third and fourth column of Table 2, we report the average impact of firm 
diversification on the value of corporate cash holdings. This regression follows the 
primary specification as indicated in equation (1). To calculate the marginal value of 
cash holdings for single-segment firms, we need to use the coefficients of the same 
three items as before (∆Cash Holdings, Cash Holdingt-1 * ∆Cash Holdings, and 
Leverage * ∆Cash Holdings). We find that the marginal value of one dollar to 
shareholders in single-segment firms is $1.08. To calculate the marginal value of cash 
holdings for diversified firms, we need to use the coefficient of the interaction term 
Firm Diversification * ∆Cash Holdings. Therefore, the marginal value of one dollar to 
shareholders in diversified firms is $0.92 (= 1.295 + (−0.160) + (−0.741*16.56%) + 
(−0.478 ∗ 20.14%)).  
   These results indicate that an extra dollar in diversified firms on average is valued 
16 cents (p-value = 0.01) less than an extra dollar in single-segment firms. It implies 
that firm diversification reduces the value of cash holdings. The results are consistent 
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with two hypotheses: agency problems and coinsurance effect. Although the 
coinsurance effect hypothesis only predicts a negative relation between firm 
diversification and the value of cash holdings for financially constrained firms, we 
may still find a negative coefficient in the entire sample. We therefore proceed to 
conduct the tests by dividing the sample into financially unconstrained and 
constrained firms. 
4.2. Financial constraints 
The four hypotheses make different predictions on the relation between firm 
diversification and the value of cash holdings depending on whether or not a firm is 
financially constrained. We design three criteria of financial constraints based on the 
measures used in the previous literature. We use the lagged variables as the measure 
of the criteria. Since lagged variables are pre-determined, they are less likely subject 
to the endogeneity problem.  
4.2.1. The criteria of financial constraints 
   Firm size.  Larger firms are better known and have better access to capital 
markets than smaller firms. Therefore larger firms face fewer constraints when raising 
external capital to finance their investments. We use the logarithm of total assets as 
the measure for firm size. For every year of the sample period, we rank all firms by 
their size at year t-1, and assign a firm to the financially unconstrained (constrained) 
group if its lagged size is above (below) the mean of the annual size distribution. 
  Firm size and payout.  Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) state that financially 
constrained firms have lower payout ratios. Firms with higher payout ratios are more 
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likely to have sufficient internal resources to finance their investments. We combine 
payout ratios with firm size to get the second criteria. We use the ratio of dividends to 
total assets as the measure for the payout ratio. For every year of the sample period, we 
sort all firms according to their payout ratios at year t-1, and assign a firm to the 
financially unconstrained (constrained) group if the firm concurrently meets two 
criteria: its lagged size is above (below) the mean of the annual size distribution; its 
lagged payout ratio is above (below) the mean of the annual payout distribution. 
   Firm size and credit rating.  Firms with a credit rating have better access to 
public debt markets. They are usually better known, and have less difficulty in raising 
external funds to finance their investments. We combine credit rating with firm size to 
get the third criteria. For every firm-year observation, we get the data for long-term 
issuer credit rating at year t-1 from Compustat, and assign a firm to the financially 
unconstrained (constrained) group if the firm concurrently meets two criteria: its 
lagged size is above (below) the mean of the annual size distribution; its lagged 
long-term issuer credit rating is available (unavailable).3 
4.2.2. Results 
   Table 3 presents the results by dividing the sample into financially unconstrained 
and constrained firms according to the three criteria, and reports the marginal value of 
cash below the regressions. Panel A, B and C report the results using each of the three 
criteria. We find that the coefficients of the interaction term, Firm Diversification * 
∆Cash Holdings, are both negative and significant in all the three panels, supporting 
                                                        
3 We combine firm size with payout/credit rating because a firm is more unconstrained or constrained 
under these criteria. We get consistent results if we separately use payout/credit rating as the criteria. 
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the interpretation that firm diversification reduces the value of cash holdings in both 
financially unconstrained firms and constrained firms. Among the predictions of the 
four hypotheses, the findings are most consistent with the agency hypothesis that 
predicts a lower value of cash holdings in diversified firms, no matter the firms are 
financially unconstrained or constrained. 
4.3. Corporate governance 
   We conduct an additional test that more explicitly examines the impact of agency 
problems on the value of cash holdings. The negative impact from agency problems is 
more severe in a diversified firm with poor corporate governance. Therefore we 
expect that the value of cash holdings is even lower for a diversified firm with poor 
corporate governance. We use the data on corporate governance to examine this 
additional prediction of the agency hypothesis. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
construct a corporate governance index with the data on corporate charters of takeover 
defenses from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database. A higher 
Gompers et al. index indicates more restrictions on shareholder rights, thus 
corresponding with poorer corporate governance.4 The IRRC database only provides 
the data for a subset of firms (mostly larger firms) in the sample. We conduct the 
analysis with this subsample that contains 8242 firm-year observations.  
We construct a triple interaction term, Firm Diversification * ∆Cash Holdings    
* Poor Governance. Poor Governance is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
Gompers et al. index of a firm is within the top 90 percentile of the subsample 
                                                        
4 Gompers et al. index has a possible range from 1 to 24. See Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) for 
more details. 
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(Gindex ≥ 12) and 0 otherwise. This interaction term represents the difference in the 
value of cash holdings between a diversified firm with fewer restrictions on 
shareholder rights and a diversified firm with more restrictions on shareholder rights. 
We use a different cutoff point where the Gompers et al. index of a firm is within the 
top 75 percentile of the subsample (Gindex ≥ 11) as the robustness check. We also 
include the Poor Governance dummy in the regression to ensure that the estimated 
coefficient of the triple interaction term is due to the interaction, and not due to poor 
corporate governance itself. 
  Table 4 presents the findings. We find that the coefficient of the triple interaction 
term, Firm Diversification * ∆Cash Holdings * Poor Governance, is negative and 
significant. We calculate the marginal value of cash holdings and report the results 
below the regressions. While an extra dollar is worth $0.83 in a diversified firm with 
fewer restrictions on shareholder rights, the same dollar is only worth between $0.53 
and $0.58 in a diversified firm with more restrictions on shareholder rights. These 
results support the interpretation that the value of cash holdings is even lower in a 
diversified firm with more restrictions on shareholder rights.  
4.4. Alternative measure of the unexpected change in cash holdings 
Our primary specification essentially represents a long-term event study. The 
excess return reflects the market reaction to the unexpected changes in cash holdings.  
We follow Faulkender and Wang (2006) and repeat our analysis using the net change 
in cash holdings defined as the realized change in cash holdings minus the average 
change in cash holdings in the corresponding benchmark portfolio over the same 
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period. There is an additional advantage to use the net change in cash holdings. Bates, 
Kahle and Stulz (2006) document a time trend in the level of cash holdings. We 
expect that the time trend is present in both a firm’s realized change in cash holdings 
and the average change in cash holdings in the corresponding benchmark portfolio. We 
therefore can reduce the impact of the time trend by using the net change in cash 
holdings.  
   Table 5A shows that an extra dollar is worth $1.08 ($0.93) for single-segment 
(diversified) firms. We repeat the analysis on the marginal value of cash for financially 
unconstrained firms and constrained firms, and report the results using firm size as the 
criteria of financial constraints in this table. We get consistent results using the other 
two financial constraints criteria. The results are similar to those presented above. Firm 
diversification reduces the value of cash holdings in both financially unconstrained 
firms and constrained firms. Table 5B presents the results using the net change in cash 
holdings with corporate governance variables. While an extra dollar is worth between 
$0.83 and $0.86 in a diversified firm with fewer restrictions on shareholder rights, it is 
only worth between $0.52 and $0.54 in a diversified firm with more restrictions on 
shareholder rights.  
4.5. About the endogeneity 
   Campa and Kedia (2002) argue that firm diversification can be an endogenous 
choice made by a firm, and use econometric techniques to control for the potential 
endogeneity problem. Other papers in the literature have expressed the similar 
concern (e.g., Graham, Lemmon and Wolf, 2002). We follow Campa and Kedia (2002) 
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and use three econometric methods to examine the impact of firm diversification on 
the value of cash holdings controlling for the endogeneity problem.   
4.5.1. Methodology 
The three econometric methods are the Heckman two-stage estimation, 
instrumental variables estimation and fixed effect estimation. Each of them addresses 
the endogeneity problem from a different perspective.  
We apply the Heckman two-stage estimation to control for a firm’s self selection 
into diversification. In the first stage, we estimate a probit regression to model the 
decision of a firm to diversify. The variables are motivated by Campa and Kedia 
(2002). They include various firm-specific, industry and macroeconomic 
characteristics that can influence a firm’s decision to diversify. Since some two-year 
lagged variables (size, EBIT, and capital expenditures) are used in the probit 
regression, it slightly reduces the sample size to 27767 firm-year observations due to 
incomplete data. Table 6A demonstrates the probit regression. We obtain the Lambda 
from the probit estimates. The calculation of Lambda follows the standard of the 
Heckman two-stage methodology, and is reported in the Appendix. In the second 
stage, we estimate the regressions with the Lambda as an additional control variable. 
This provides the treatment for a firm’s self-selection into diversification. 
We use instrumental variables estimation to examine the underlying causal 
relations. We follow Campa and Kedia (2002) and use the estimated probability of 
diversification from the probit model as a generated instrument. In the first stage, we 
use all the exogenous variables and the probability of diversification as explanatory 
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variables in the decision to diversify. In the second stage, we use the fitted value from 
the first stage as an instrument for diversification to evaluate the effect of 
diversification on the value of cash holdings. Campa and Kedia (2002) provide more 
details on the rationales of this methodology.  
   We introduce a two-way fixed effect estimation to account for the omitted variable 
problem. Fixed firm effects and year effects are used to control for unobservable firm 
characteristics and time effects. We exclude the firms with only one observation 
during the sample period in order to estimate the fixed effect regression, thus leaving 
27151 firm-year observations in the sample. 
4.5.2. Results 
   We report the results using the three econometric methods on the entire sample in 
Table 6B. The first and second columns show the second stage of the Heckman 
two-stage estimation. We find that the marginal value of one dollar is $0.93 ($1.08) 
for diversified (single-segment) firms. The third and the fourth columns report the 
second stage of the instrumental variables estimation. The marginal value of one 
dollar is $0.76 ($1.09) for diversified (single-segment) firms. We find that the 
coefficient of the interaction term, Firm Diversification * ∆Cash Holdings, is –0.334, 
implying that the instrumental variables estimation reveals a more negative impact of 
diversification on the value of cash. The fifth and the sixth columns show the results 
using fixed effect estimation. We find that an additional dollar is worth $0.95 ($1.07) 
in diversified (single-segment) firms. These results are consistent with the 
interpretation that firm diversification reduces the value of cash controlling for the 
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potential endogeneity problem.   
We report the results using size as financial constraints criteria and corporate 
governance variables in Table 6C. This table only shows the results of the Heckman 
two-stage estimation for brevity. We get consistent results using the other two 
econometric methods as well as the other two criteria of financial constraints. We find 
that firm diversification reduces the value of cash holdings in both financially 
unconstrained and constrained firms. An extra dollar in diversified firms is worth 
between $0.92 and $0.96, while it is worth between $1.05 and $1.11 in 
single-segment firms. Corporate governance has an additional impact on the value of 
cash holdings in diversified firms. We find that an extra dollar only worth $0.50 in a 
diversified firm with more restrictions on shareholder rights. These results give 
further support to the agency hypothesis controlling for the potential endogeneity 
problem. 
4.6. Subsample with positive leverage 
   The hypothesis based on shareholder-bondholder conflicts is related with 
leveraged firms. We conduct robustness checks for the subsample with positive 
leverage. We repeat the above analysis and find similar results in all the main 
specifications.  
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5. Conclusion 
   We study the relation between firm diversification and the value of corporate cash 
holdings. We develop four hypotheses based on different theories of firm 
diversification. We use the methodology in Faulkender and Wang (2006), and find 
that the marginal value of one dollar in diversified (single-segment) firms is $0.92 
($1.08). The findings imply that the same dollar is valued 16 cents less in diversified 
firms than single-segment firms. We find that firm diversification reduces the value of 
cash in both financially unconstrained and constrained firms, and that the value of 
cash is even lower for the diversified firms with more restrictions on shareholder 
rights. We obtain similar results when we use an alternative measure for the 
unexpected change in cash holdings and three econometric methods to control for the 
potential endogeneity problem.  
   These findings are most consistent with the predictions of the agency hypothesis. 
We conclude that firm diversification reduces the value of corporate cash holdings 
through agency problems. 
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Appendix:  Definition of the Variables 
 
Ri,t Ri,t is stock return over fiscal year t-1 to t.  
RBi,t RBi,t is stock i’s benchmark return over fiscal year t-1 to t. The benchmark portfolio 
is one of the 25 Fama and French portfolios formed on size and book-to-market. 
Excess Return Excess Return is defined as Ri,t – RBi,t. 
MVi,t-1 MVi,t-1 is market value of equity at time t-1 computed as price (Compustat item 
#199) times shares outstanding (#25). 
Cash Holdings Cash Holdings is defined as cash and marketable securities (#1). 
Earnings Earnings is defined as earnings before extraordinary items (#18 + #15 + #50 + 
#51).  
Net Assets Net Assets is defined as total assets minus cash holdings (#6 – #1). 
R&D R&D is defined as research and development expenses (#46). 
Interest Expenses Interest Expenses is defined as interest expenses (#15). 
Dividends Dividends is defined as common dividends (#21). 
New Financing New Financing is defined as net new equity issues (#108 – #115) plus net new debt 
issues (#111 – #114). 
Leverage Leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt (#9) and debt in current liability 
(#34) divided by total assets (#6). 
Firm Diversification Firm Diversification is a dummy variable that equals 1 for diversified firms and 0 
for single-segment firms. 
Poor Governance Poor Governance is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the Gompers et al. index of a 
firm is within the top 90 percentile (or top 75 percentile as an alternative cutoff 
point) of the subsample. 
 
Lambda We assume that a firm’s decision to diversify is determined by: 
   Dit* = γZit + uit                                                                                              
         Dit = 1, if  Dit* > 0 
Dit = 0, if  Dit* < 0 
where: Dit* is an unobservable latent variable. Dit is a dummy variable (1 for 
diversified firms, and 0 for single-segment firms). Zit is a set of variables that 
affect a firm’s decision to diversify. uit is an error term. 
We first estimate the above equation using a probit model to get the estimates of γ 
denoted by γe. 
  
Lambda is calculated as follows: 
        Lambdait = 
)ZΦ(γ
)Z(
ite
iteγφ * Dit + 
)ZΦ(γ1 
)Z(
ite
it
−
− eγφ  * (1 – Dit)                         
where:φ  is the density function of the standard normal distribution.Φ is the 
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Dit is a 
dummy variable (1 for diversified firms, and 0 for single-segment firms). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
This table provides summary statistics for the data in our sample over the period 1998-2005. Ri,t is 
stock return over fiscal year t-1 to t. Excess Return is defined as Ri,t – RBi,t, where RBi,t is stock i’s 
benchmark return over fiscal year t-1 to t. All variables except Ri,t , Excess Return and Leverage are 
standardized by the lagged market value of equity. Cash Holdings is cash plus marketable securities. 
∆Cash Holdings is the one-year change of cash holdings (Cash Holdingst – Cash Holdingst-1). 
∆Earnings is the one-year change of earnings before extraordinary items. ∆Net Assets is the one-year 
change of total assets minus cash holdings. ∆R&D is the one-year change of research and development 
expenses. ∆Interest Expense is the one-year change of interest expenses. ∆Dividends is the one-year 
change of common dividends. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. New Financing is net new 
equity issues (equity issued minus repurchases) plus net new debt issues (debt issued minus debt 
retired). More details on the definition of the variables are provided in Appendix. 
 
 
 Mean Median 25th Percentile 75th Percentile Std. Dev. 
Ri,t 0.1773 0.1271 -0.2245 0.4962 0.7799 
Excess Return 0.0321 0.0094 -0.3226 0.3624 0.5459 
∆Cash Holdings 0.0140 0.0007 -0.0354 0.0398 0.1368 
Cash Holdingst-1 0.1656 0.0938 0.0312 0.2311 0.1829 
∆Earnings 0.0139 0.0063 -0.0365 0.0475 0.1448 
∆Net Assets 0.0456 0.0268 -0.0450 0.1350 0.2947 
∆R&D -0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 0.0276 
∆Interest Expenses 0.0012 0.0000 -0.0016 0.0030 0.0294 
∆Dividends -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0070 
Leverage 0.2014 0.1549 0.0079 0.3360 0.2015 
New Financing 0.0391 0.0027 -0.0258 0.0664 0.1584 
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Table 2: The Value of Cash Holdings 
 
This table reports the value of cash holdings. The dependent variable is Excess Return defined as Ri,t – 
RBi,t. All variables except Excess Return, Firm Diversification, and Leverage are standardized by the 
lagged market value of equity. Cash Holdings is cash plus marketable securities. ∆Cash Holdings is the 
one-year change of cash holdings (Cash Holdingst – Cash Holdingst-1). Firm Diversification is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 for diversified firms and 0 for single-segment firms. ∆Earnings is the 
one-year change of earnings before extraordinary items. ∆Net Assets is the one-year change of total 
assets minus cash holdings. ∆R&D is the one-year change of research and development expenses. 
∆Interest Expense is the one-year change of interest expenses. ∆Dividends is the one-year change of 
common dividends. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. New Financing is net new equity issues 
plus net new debt issues. 
 
 coef. p-value coef. p-value 
Intercept 0.003  0.60  0.003 0.63 
∆Cash Holdings 1.245  0.01 1.295 0.01 
Firm Diversification * ∆Cash Holdings   -0.160 0.01 
Firm Diversification   0.001 0.98 
∆Earnings 0.649  0.01 0.648 0.01 
∆Net Assets 0.284  0.01 0.284 0.01 
∆R&D 0.742  0.01 0.744 0.01 
∆Interest Expenses -1.305  0.01 -1.309 0.01 
∆Dividends 2.814  0.01 2.821 0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1 0.194  0.01 0.195 0.01 
Leverage -0.224  0.01 -0.223 0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1* ∆Cash Holdings -0.726  0.01 -0.741 0.01 
Leverage * ∆Cash Holdings -0.509  0.01 -0.478 0.01 
New Financing 0.011  0.65  0.007 0.75 
Observations 28563 28563 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.14 
 
 
The marginal value of $1 
  Single-segment firms $1.08 
Whole sample $1.02 
  Diversified firms $0.92 
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Table 3: Regressions for Financially Unconstrained and Constrained Firms 
 
This table reports the results using financial constraints criteria. The regression results are presented 
across groups of financially unconstrained and constrained firms (see text for definitions). Financial 
constraints criteria are: size (Panel A), size and payout (Panel B), and size and rating (Panel C). The 
dependent variable is Excess Return defined as Ri,t – RBi,t. All variables except Excess Return, Firm 
Diversification, and Leverage are standardized by the lagged market value of equity. Cash Holdings is 
cash plus marketable securities. ∆Cash Holdings is the one-year change of cash holdings (Cash 
Holdingst – Cash Holdingst-1). Firm Diversification is a dummy variable that equals 1 for diversified 
firms and 0 for single-segment firms. ∆Earnings is the one-year change of earnings before 
extraordinary items. ∆Net Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ∆R&D is 
the one-year change of research and development expenses. ∆Interest Expense is the one-year change 
of interest expenses. ∆Dividends is the one-year change of common dividends. Leverage is the ratio of 
debt to total assets. New Financing is net new equity issues plus net new debt issues. 
 
Panel A. Financial constraints criteria: Size 
 
 Unconstrained Constrained 
 coef. p-value coef. p-value 
Intercept 0.022 0.01 -0.054 0.01 
∆Cash Holdings 1.165 0.01 1.368 0.01 
Firm Diversification * ∆Cash Holdings -0.145 0.05 -0.161 0.02 
Firm Diversification -0.029 0.01 0.015 0.13 
∆Earnings 0.747 0.01 0.626 0.01 
∆Net Assets 0.264 0.01 0.335 0.01 
∆R&D 0.297 0.25 0.810 0.01 
∆Interest Expenses -1.585 0.01 -1.676 0.01 
∆Dividends 2.079 0.01 4.858 0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1 0.143 0.01 0.308 0.01 
Leverage -0.155 0.01 -0.144 0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1* ∆Cash Holdings -0.763 0.01 -0.835 0.01 
Leverage * ∆Cash Holdings -0.180 0.26 -0.861 0.01 
New Financing -0.190 0.01 0.165 0.01 
Observations 13441 15122 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.14 
 
 
 The marginal value of $1 
 Unconstrained Constrained 
Single-segment firms $1.03 $1.12 
Diversified firms $0.88 $0.96 
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Panel B. Financial constraints criteria: Size and payout 
 
 Unconstrained Constrained 
 coef. p-value coef. p-value 
Intercept 0.017  0.14  -0.055 0.01 
∆Cash Holdings 1.339  0.01 1.366 0.01 
Firm Diversification * ∆Cash Holdings -0.199  0.09  -0.168 0.02 
Firm Diversification -0.017  0.12  0.023 0.05 
∆Earnings 0.890  0.01 0.598 0.01 
∆Net Assets 0.243  0.01 0.336 0.01 
∆R&D 0.317  0.52  0.726 0.01 
∆Interest Expenses -3.100  0.01 -1.585 0.01 
∆Dividends 2.958  0.01 6.304 0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1 0.119  0.01  0.307 0.01 
Leverage -0.116  0.01 -0.143 0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1* ∆Cash Holdings -1.554  0.01 -0.811 0.01 
Leverage * ∆Cash Holdings -0.450  0.31  -0.904 0.01 
New Financing -0.186  0.01  0.177 0.01 
Observations 4539 12650 
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.15 
 
 The marginal value of $1
 Unconstrained Constrained 
Single-segment firms $1.10 $1.12
Diversified firms $0.90 $0.95 
 
Panel C. Financial constraints criteria: Size and rating 
 
 Unconstrained Constrained 
 coef. p-value coef. p-value 
Intercept 0.023 0.14 -0.064 0.01 
∆Cash Holdings 1.127 0.01 1.467 0.01 
Firm Diversification * ∆Cash Holdings -0.231 0.05 -0.097 0.09 
Firm Diversification -0.041 0.01 0.014 0.19 
∆Earnings 0.900 0.01 0.654 0.01 
∆Net Assets 0.215 0.01 0.326 0.01 
∆R&D -0.270 0.58 0.725 0.01 
∆Interest Expenses -1.628 0.01 -1.656 0.01 
∆Dividends 4.300 0.01 4.827 0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1 0.286 0.01 0.388 0.01 
Leverage -0.085 0.02 -0.146 0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1* ∆Cash Holdings -0.553 0.02 -1.665 0.01 
Leverage * ∆Cash Holdings -0.205 0.27 -0.705 0.01 
New Financing -0.145 0.01 0.200 0.01 
Observations 5947 15017 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.14 
 
 The marginal value of $1
 Unconstrained Constrained 
Single-segment firms $1.01 $1.07
Diversified firms $0.77 $0.98 
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Table 4: The Impact of Corporate Governance 
 
This table reports the impact of corporate governance. The dependent variable is Excess Return defined as 
Ri,t – RBi,t. All variables except Excess Return, Firm Diversification, Poor Governance, and Leverage are 
standardized by the lagged market value of equity. Cash Holdings is cash plus marketable securities. ∆Cash 
Holdings is the one-year change of cash holdings (Cash Holdingst – Cash Holdingst-1). Firm 
Diversification is a dummy variable that equals 1 for diversified firms and 0 for single-segment firms. Poor 
Governance is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the Gompers et al. index of a firm is within the top 90 
percentile (or top 75 percentile as an alternative cutoff point) of the subsample. ∆Earnings is the one-year 
change of earnings before extraordinary items. ∆Net Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus 
cash holdings. ∆R&D is the one-year change of research and development expenses. ∆Interest Expense is 
the one-year change of interest expenses. ∆Dividends is the one-year change of common dividends. 
Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. New Financing is net new equity issues plus net new debt 
issues. 
 
 
Poor Governance Criteria 
Gindex ≥ 12 (Top 90 Pct) 
Poor Governance Criteria 
Gindex ≥ 11 (Top 75 Pct) 
 coef. p-value coef. p-value 
Intercept 0.071 0.01 0.072 0.01 
∆Cash Holdings 1.466 0.01 1.460 0.01 
Firm Diversification * ∆Cash Holdings -0.255 0.01 -0.252 0.01 
Firm Diversification * ∆Cash Holdings * Poor Governance -0.301 0.05 -0.251 0.08 
Firm Diversification -0.026 0.01 -0.027 0.01 
Poor Governance -0.023 0.04 -0.014 0.13 
∆Earnings 0.667 0.01 0.669 0.01 
∆Net Assets 0.274 0.01 0.274 0.01 
∆R&D 0.589 0.02 0.591 0.02 
∆Interest Expenses -2.331 0.01 -2.336 0.01 
∆Dividends 3.416 0.01 3.450 0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1 -0.051 0.11 -0.052 0.11 
Leverage -0.093 0.01 -0.094 0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1* ∆Cash Holdings -1.400 0.01 -1.384 0.01 
Leverage * ∆Cash Holdings -1.151 0.01 -1.143 0.01 
New Financing -0.238 0.01 -0.236 0.01 
Observations 8242 8242 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.11 
 
 The marginal value of $1 
 
Poor Governance Criteria 
Gindex ≥ 12 (Top 90 Pct) 
Poor Governance Criteria 
Gindex ≥ 11 (Top 75 Pct) 
Single-segment firms $1.09 $1.08 
Diversified firms $0.83 $0.83 
Diversified firms with poor governance $0.53 $0.58 
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Table 5A: The Value of Cash Holdings 
— Alternative Measure of the Unexpected Change in Cash Holdings 
 
This table reports the value of cash holdings using an alternative measure of the unexpected change in 
cash holdings. Firm size is the criteria of financial constraints. The dependent variable is Excess Return 
defined as Ri,t – RBi,t. All variables except Excess Return, Firm Diversification, and Leverage are 
standardized by the lagged market value of equity. Cash Holdings is cash plus marketable securities. 
∆Net Cash Holdings is the realized change in cash holdings minus the average change in cash holdings 
in the corresponding benchmark portfolio over the same period (see text for more details). Firm 
Diversification is a dummy variable that equals 1 for diversified firms and 0 for single-segment firms. 
∆Earnings is the one-year change of earnings before extraordinary items (Earningst – Earningst-1). 
∆Net Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ∆R&D is the one-year change 
of research and development expenses. ∆Interest Expense is the one-year change of interest expenses. 
∆Dividends is the one-year change of common dividends. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. 
New Financing is net new equity issues plus net new debt issues. 
 
 Entire Sample Unconstrained Constrained 
 coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value 
Intercept -0.016 0.01 0.037 0.01 -0.054 0.01 
∆ Net Cash Holdings 1.394 0.01 1.239 0.01 1.448 0.01 
Firm Diversification * ∆Net Cash Holdings -0.155 0.01  -0.143 0.05  -0.166 0.01  
Firm Diversification 0.001 0.98  -0.030 0.01 0.017 0.10  
∆Earnings 0.652 0.01 0.750 0.01 0.631 0.01 
∆Net Assets 0.291 0.01 0.264 0.01 0.316 0.01 
∆R&D 0.698 0.01 0.242 0.35  0.767 0.01 
∆Interest Expenses -1.427 0.01 -1.658 0.01 -1.333 0.01 
∆Dividends 2.926 0.01 2.041 0.01 4.067 0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1 0.250 0.01 0.169 0.01 0.348 0.01 
Leverage -0.147 0.01 -0.151 0.01 -0.172 0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1* ∆ Net Cash Holdings -1.211 0.01 -1.101 0.01 -1.262 0.01 
Leverage * ∆ Net Cash Holdings -0.706 0.01 -0.219 0.17  -0.932 0.01 
New Financing -0.025 0.28  -0.190 0.01 0.148 0.01 
Observations 28563 13441 15122 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.11 0.14 
 
 
The marginal value of $1 
 Entire Sample Unconstrained Constrained 
  Single-segment firms $1.08 $1.05 $1.11 
  Diversified firms $0.93 $0.91 $0.94 
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Table 5B: The Value of Cash Holdings: The Impact of Corporate Governance 
— Alternative Measure of the Unexpected Change in Cash Holdings 
 
This table reports the impact of corporate governance with an alternative measure of the unexpected change 
in cash holdings. The dependent variable is Excess Return defined as Ri,t – RBi,t. All variables except Excess 
Return, Firm Diversification, Poor Governance, and Leverage are standardized by the lagged market value 
of equity. Cash Holdings is cash plus marketable securities. ∆Net Cash Holdings is the realized change in 
cash holdings minus the average change in cash holdings in the corresponding benchmark portfolio over the 
same period (see text for more details). Firm Diversification is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
diversified firms and 0 for single-segment firms. Poor Governance is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
Gompers et al. index of a firm is within the top 90 percentile (or top 75 percentile as an alternative cutoff 
point) of the subsample. ∆Earnings is the one-year change of earnings before extraordinary items 
(Earningst – Earningst-1). ∆Net Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ∆R&D is 
the one-year change of research and development expenses. ∆Interest Expense is the one-year change of 
interest expenses. ∆Dividends is the one-year change of common dividends. Leverage is the ratio of debt to 
total assets. New Financing is net new equity issues plus net new debt issues. 
 
 
Poor Governance Criteria 
Gindex ≥ 12 (Top 90 Pct) 
Poor Governance Criteria 
Gindex ≥ 11 (Top 75 Pct) 
 coef. p-value coef. p-value
Intercept 0.075  0.01 0.082  0.01 
∆Net Cash Holdings 1.486  0.01 1.468  0.01 
Firm Diversification * ∆Net Cash Holdings -0.225  0.09  -0.245  0.05  
Firm Diversification * ∆Net Cash Holdings * Poor Governance -0.343  0.07  -0.288  0.08  
Firm Diversification -0.028  0.01  -0.031  0.01  
Poor Governance -0.028  0.02  -0.019  0.06  
∆Earnings 1.235  0.01 1.189  0.01 
∆Net Assets 0.307  0.01 0.286  0.01 
∆R&D 0.817  0.01  0.809  0.01  
∆Interest Expenses -2.825  0.01 -2.647  0.01 
∆Dividends 3.865  0.01 3.633  0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1 -0.002  0.96  -0.003  0.93  
Leverage -0.104  0.01  -0.100  0.01  
Cash Holdingst-1* ∆ Net Cash Holdings -0.922  0.01  -0.919  0.01  
Leverage * ∆ Net Cash Holdings -1.539  0.01 -1.497  0.01 
New Financing -0.223  0.01 -0.204  0.01 
Observations 8242 8242 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.12 
 
 
 The marginal value of $1 
 
Poor Governance Criteria 
Gindex ≥ 12 (Top 90 Pct) 
Poor Governance Criteria 
Gindex ≥ 11 (Top 75 Pct) 
Single-segment firms $1.08 $1.07 
Diversified firms $0.86 $0.83 
Diversified firms with poor governance $0.52 $0.54 
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Table 6A: Probit Regression 
 
This table reports probit estimates. The dependent variable takes the value 1 for diversified firms and 0 
for single-segment firms. Size is the logarithm of sales. EBIT is the ratio of earnings before interests 
and taxes to assets. Capital Expenditures is the ratio of capital expenditures to assets.  S&P is a 
dummy that equals 1 when the firm is part of the S&P index and 0 otherwise. Major Stock Exchange is 
a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is listed on Nasdaq, NYSE, or AMEX, and 0 otherwise. Fraction of 
Diversified Firms in the Industry is the fraction of all the firms in the industry that are diversified firms. 
Fraction of Industry Sales by Diversified Firms is the fraction of industry sales accounted for by 
diversified firms. GDP is Gross Domestic Product. GDP Growth is the growth rate of Gross Domestic 
Product. 
 
 
 coef. p-value 
Intercept -3.592 0.01 
Size 0.071 0.01 
Size t-1 -0.020 0.45 
Size t-2 0.085 0.01 
EBIT 0.710 0.01 
EBIT t-1 -0.711 0.01 
EBIT t-2 0.160 0.02 
Capital Expenditures 0.562 0.01 
Capital Expenditures t-1 0.220 0.07 
Capital Expenditures t-2 -0.017 0.87 
S&P 0.115 0.01 
Major Stock Exchange 0.010 0.68 
Fraction of Diversified Firms in the Industry 1.889 0.01 
Fraction of Industry Sales by Diversified Firms 0.555 0.01 
GDP t-1 -0.001 0.01 
GDP Growth -0.286 0.65 
Observations 27767 
Pseudo R2 0.14 
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Table 6B: Three Econometric Methods  
 
This table reports the results using three econometrics methods to control for the potential endogeneity 
problem (see text for more details). The dependent variable is Excess Return defined as Ri,t – RBi,t. All 
variables except Excess Return, Firm Diversification, and Leverage are standardized by the lagged market 
value of equity. Cash Holdings is cash plus marketable securities. ∆Cash Holdings is the one-year change 
of cash holdings (Cash Holdingst – Cash Holdingst-1). Firm Diversification is a dummy variable that equals 
1 for diversified firms and 0 for single-segment firms. The fitted value is used in the instrumental variables 
estimation. ∆Earnings is the one-year change of earnings before extraordinary items. ∆Net Assets is the 
one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ∆R&D is the one-year change of research and 
development expenses. ∆Interest Expense is the one-year change of interest expenses. ∆Dividends is the 
one-year change of common dividends. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. New Financing is net 
new equity issues plus net new debt issues. Lambda is obtained from the probit estimates in Table 6A. 
 
 
Heckman Two-Stage 
Estimation: Second Stage 
 
Instrumental Variables 
Estimation:  
Second Stage 
Fixed Effect Estimation 
(firm effects and year 
effects not reported) 
 coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value 
Intercept -0.012 0.17 0.052 0.01   
∆Cash Holdings 1.316 0.01 1.435 0.01 1.278 0.01 
Firm Diversification * ∆Cash Holdings -0.145 0.01 -0.334 0.01 -0.118 0.02 
Firm Diversification -0.010 0.56 -0.084 0.01 -0.008 0.61 
∆Earnings 0.672 0.01 0.640 0.01 0.566 0.01 
∆Net Assets 0.293 0.01 0.234 0.01 0.210 0.01 
∆R&D 0.689 0.01 0.385 0.01 0.486 0.01 
∆Interest Expenses -1.416 0.01 -1.307 0.01 -0.894 0.01 
∆Dividends 3.008 0.01 2.545 0.01 2.069 0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1 0.202 0.01 0.270 0.01 0.804 0.01 
Leverage -0.168 0.01 -0.160 0.01 -0.422 0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1* ∆Cash Holdings -0.797 0.01 -1.545 0.01 -0.842 0.01 
Leverage * ∆Cash Holdings -0.687 0.01 -0.558 0.01 -0.320 0.01 
New Financing -0.020 0.42 0.062 0.01 0.085 0.01 
Lambda 0.004 0.72     
Observations 27767 27767 27151 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.12 0.14 
 
 
 The marginal value of $1 
 
Heckman Two-Stage 
Estimation 
Instrumental 
Variables Estimation 
Fixed Effect 
Estimation 
Single-segment firms $1.08 $1.09 $1.07 
Diversified firms $0.93 $0.76 $0.95 
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Table 6C: Heckman Two-Stage Estimation  
— Financial Constraints and the Impact of Corporate Governance 
 
This table reports the second stage of the Heckman two-stage estimation. The dependent variable is Excess Return 
defined as Ri,t – RBi,t. Columns 1-4 are presented across groups of financially unconstrained and constrained firms 
separated by size (see text for definitions). Columns 5 and 6 report the results with corporate governance variables. 
All variables except Excess Return, Firm Diversification, Poor Governance, and Leverage are standardized by the 
lagged market value of equity. Cash Holdings is cash plus marketable securities. ∆Cash Holdings is the one-year 
change of cash holdings. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable that equals 1 for diversified firms and 0 for 
single-segment firms. Poor Governance is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the Gompers et al. index of a firm is 
within the top 90 percentile of the subsample. ∆Earnings is the one-year change of earnings before extraordinary 
items. ∆Net Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ∆R&D is the one-year change of 
research and development expenses. ∆Interest Expense is the one-year change of interest expenses. ∆Dividends is 
the one-year change of common dividends. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. New Financing is net new 
equity issues plus net new debt issues. Lambda is obtained from the probit estimates in Table 6A. 
 Unconstrained Constrained 
Poor Governance Criteria 
Gindex ≥ 12 (Top 90 Pct) 
 coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value 
Intercept 0.042 0.01  -0.047 0.01 0.088  0.01 
∆Cash Holdings 1.182 0.01 1.359 0.01 1.485  0.01 
Firm Diversification * ∆Cash Holdings -0.128 0.08  -0.149 0.03 -0.261  0.01  
Firm Diversification * ∆Cash Holdings  
* Poor Governance 
  
  
-0.338  0.04  
Firm Diversification -0.067 0.01 0.005 0.88 -0.089  0.01 
Poor Governance     -0.017  0.17  
∆Earnings 0.778 0.01 0.639 0.01 0.739  0.01 
∆Net Assets 0.263 0.01 0.336 0.01 0.326  0.01 
∆R&D 0.373 0.16  0.774 0.01 0.597  0.03  
∆Interest Expenses -1.877 0.01 -1.687 0.01 -2.719  0.01 
∆Dividends 2.794 0.01 4.953 0.01 4.258  0.01 
Cash Holdingst-1 0.160 0.01 0.297 0.01 -0.065  0.06  
Leverage -0.140 0.01 -0.145 0.01 -0.099  0.01  
Cash Holdingst-1* ∆Cash Holdings -0.802 0.01 -0.829 0.01 -1.242  0.01 
Leverage * ∆Cash Holdings -0.138 0.39  -0.883 0.01 -1.268  0.01 
New Financing -0.175 0.01 0.158 0.01 -0.278  0.01 
Lambda 0.026 0.09  0.005 0.83 0.047  0.01  
Observations 13223 14544 8242 
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.15 0.12 
 
 The marginal value of $1 
 Unconstrained Constrained 
Poor Governance Criteria 
Gindex ≥ 12 (Top 90 Pct) 
Single-segment firms $1.05 $1.11 $1.10 
Diversified firms $0.92 $0.96 $0.84 
Diversified firms with poor governance   $0.50 
 
